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What is “new” about this new incentives 
database? 
• More industry detail (45 industries, over 90% of wages) 
• More years (26 years, 1990-2015)
• 33 states (over 90% of US output)
• Detail on 5 incentive types: job creation tax credits, property 
tax abatements, investment tax credits, R&D credits, 
customized training
• Detail on incentive time pattern: how varies from Year One to 
Year 20 for new facility
• Free, open-access database 
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Database helps address these questions 
• Is magnitude of incentives enough to significantly affect 
business location decisions? 
• Do high-unemployment states offer more incentives?
• Do states target high-wage industries?
• Do states emphasize more “efficient” incentives?
– e.g., frontloaded incentives, customized services
• How much do incentives matter for growth?
• For evaluation of an individual state, database provides useful 
context, and model for what questions to ask and what 
methodological tools to use. 
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Methodology of database 
• Hypothetical firm model 
• Assumes new facility that opens up in base year, stays at same 
scale for 20 years. Taxes & incentives of base year projected 
forward
• Tax & incentive calculations based on BEA/IRS data on how mix 
of jobs, real property, machinery/equipment, R&D, and wage 
rates vary by industry.
• Taxes included are property taxes, sales tax on business inputs, 
and corporate income tax.
• Incentives included are job creation tax credits, property tax 
abatements, investment tax credits, R&D credits, and customized 
job training.
• Incentives only included if they are part of “usual deal.”
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Database’s outputs 
• Taxes and incentives of each type for each of 20 years of facility operation, 
for 45 industries, 33 states, and 26 starting years.
• Taxes/incentives calculated as % of “value-added” = measure of firm’s 
production = value of firm’s sales minus its inputs from other businesses.
• Also calculate weighted average for 31 “export-base” industries: industries 
that sell goods/services outside state, bringing new $ into state. 
• Report/database focus on “present value” of taxes/incentives as % of 
present value of value-added over those 20 years.
• Present value is calculated using very high 12% real discount rate. Why? 
Research evidence that this is discount rate corporate executives use in 
evaluating investment decisions.
• Implications of 12%: future heavily discounted. $ in year 10 worth only $0.36 
in Year One. 
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52015 National Average for Incentives: 1.42% of 
value-added for export-base industries
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Is 1.42% of value-added large? 
• Large? 5.83% of business profits, 30.1% of state/local business 
taxes, annual national cost of $45 billion
• Small? 0.63% of sales, 3.07% of regular wages, $2,326 per worker 
“job-year” 
• Based on literature on how taxes affect location decisions, reduced 
costs of 1% of value-added increases location decisions by 3 to 17 
times as much 
• Therefore, 1.42% cost reduction as % of value-added should tip 
between 4% and 24% of location decisions.
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Incentives vary a lot across states, even 
nearby states  
• New Mexico: 4.23% of value-added; Arizona: 1.06% 
• New York: 3.53%; Connecticut: 0.65%
• Louisiana: 3.33%; Texas: 1.24%
• Indiana: 2.68%; Illinois: 1.35%
• S. Carolina: 2.39%; N. Carolina: 0.93%
• Wisconsin: 1.52%; Minnesota: 1.14%
• Oregon: 0.70%; Washington: 0.09% 
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Incentives have tripled since 1990 
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Incentives don’t vary enough with industry characteristics 
that predict how much new industry will benefit state 
residents. For example, not much variation with wages: 
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What determines incentives? Doesn’t have much to 
do with a state’s unemployment rate
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State Incentives vs. Unemployment
Job growth increases employment to population ratios 
more when unemployment is high: This increases 
labor market and fiscal benefits of new jobs.
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Biggest determinant of a state’s 
incentives is its past incentives
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What are effects of incentives? No 
obvious strong effects of incentives on 
state growth
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Incentives
State Growth & Incentives
What is time pattern of incentives? Front-loaded, but 
full incentive payout still delayed, which is 
economically inefficient and politically problematic
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What types of incentives are most 
important? JCTCs & abatements
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16
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
In
c
e
n
ti
v
e
 V
a
lu
e
 a
s
 %
 o
f 
F
ir
s
t 
Y
e
a
r'
s
 V
a
lu
e
Facility Age in Years
How Different Incentives are Structured Over Time
JCTC Ptax abatement ITC R&D CJT
Research on customized services
• Some research on customized job training find effects per dollar on 
job creation decisions of perhaps 10 times tax incentives: 
Hollenbeck (2008), Holzer et al. (1993), and Hoyt, Jepsen, and 
Troske (2008).
• Some research on manufacturing extension services find similarly 
high cost-effectiveness ratios: Jarmin (1998; 1999), Ehlen (2001). 
• Why? (1) Targeted at small/medium-sized businesses, which are 
easier to affect; (2) Upfront, so more salient; (3) Overcoming market 
failures in information & education markets, so can have value 
greater than cost.
• Why don’t states use more? (1) Harder to deliver; (2) Less politically 
visible; (3) Doesn’t help larger businesses as much.
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Conclusions
• Incentives are large relative to state budgets, not necessarily 
large relative to private economy. But probably some 
incentives large enough to have significant effect on specific 
location decisions.
• Vary a lot across states (based more on political inertia than 
economic need?)
• Don’t vary enough across industries (the “reverse potato chip” 
rule?)
• Too long-term, not front-loaded enough
• Over-emphasis on tax incentives, under-emphasis on 
services to smaller businesses
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